Saturday, April 4, 2020

COVID: A Long Tale of the Hydroxychloroquine Mess

Originally this was going to be a multi-subject entry, but trying to explain hydroxchloroquine took a lot more words than I had anticipated, so for today I'm just going to try to tackle this one topic. Tomorrow, other randoms as we wrap up one hell of a week in COVID land.

The Billy Rubin blog staff had a bit of a temper tantrum earlier in the week on the subject of hydroxychloroquine, puzzling some of Billy's Facebook friends as they tried to understand why the innocent question of "why does this not work?" was met with replies that, to put it bluntly, were raving. The outbreak is bringing out the best and worst in Dr. Rubin, and among his worst traits is a lack of patience with what he would describe as "bad medicine." In professional circles, for the most part, he works very hard not to lose patience. On Facebook, though, he ranted a little without explaining himself properly. As a consequence, he's now a little embarrassed, and consequently is referring to himself in third person to make it look like it's someone else entirely.

Here is a more sober explanation of the problem. It's a long explanation. But let me note that absolutely nothing has changed my conviction that what has transpired on the subject of hydroxychloroquine is, from a professional standpoint, shameful. "Shame" is a strong word to use in the realm of medicine; we don't like throwing feces balls at each other like enraged chimpanzees. But it's unfortunately the right word, and unmasks a collective philosophical problem in medicine that irks all members of the Billy Rubin Blog staff.

Let's start at the beginning, all the way back to just over two whole months ago, in Wuhan, China, in the early days of the outbreak. As we now see in New York, the healthcare system in Wuhan was overwhelmed, and the doctors there lacked any known, specific therapy for an unknown virus that looked one hell of a lot like its genetic cousin SARS (what we know now but didn't then is that COVID is significantly less lethal than SARS, and for which the world should be breathing a deep sigh of relief). The doctors there, in a valiant but ultimately uncoordinated attempt at doing something, started trying out whatever they had in their arsenal that could be reasonably justified on biological grounds, and this included a variety of drugs used in treating other viral infections. (Side note: I'm no expert on the subject of the infrastructure of Chinese medicine, but based on reading years of medical papers out of China, and doing a brief sojourn to Beijing, Xi'an, and Luoyang a few years back, I'm reasonably confident that Chinese medicine in the urban areas is effectively indistinguishable from the West. The idea that China is third- or second-world in its living standards is well out of date at this point.)

The discussion of these drugs got a glancing mention in the report on the early outbreak issued by the WHO and Chinese CDC (see bottom of page 32 if interested). Because everyone was trying to play nice together, the language is careful to avoid judgement, and basically says, "well, doctors tried this stuff." The drugs included the following:

chloroquine: an antimalarial--not an antiviral, more on that in a second;
lopinavir/ritonavir: a drug used in treating HIV known as a protease inhibitor, more on that in a second, too;
alpha interferon: an old drug used mainly for treating Hep C until new drugs came along, now almost never used in the US;
ribavirin: an old drug used now mainly for two very different viruses, a respiratory virus called RSV, and a hemorrhagic fever virus called Lassa Fever

The paragraph ends with a nod to traditional Chinese medicines, where it was noted "the effects [of which] must be fully evaluated." No snark about Chinese medicines coming from me on this; the problem isn't the medicine itself, only how such compounds get evaluated so that we can know what works and what doesn't. And the same could be said of these "well, we tried this stuff" drugs. But the rationale behind using some of these drugs is, in my opinion, very thin.

Let's take the lopinavir/ritonavir example before getting to chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine. As I said, lopinavir is an HIV protease inhibitor. What's a protease? Well, when HIV reproduces, it starts out as this long strand of nucleic acid; the HIV strand then uses the body's own cellular machinery to "translate" that strand into one huge combination of all the proteins used in making an HIV particle. It would look like an Ikea set with every single piece of the furniture, from the big pieces to the individual screws, taped together. The function of the protease is to cut those pieces of tape to allow for assembly. Thus a protease inhibitor keeps everything glommed up together so that it can't be assembled. Protease inhibitors remain one of the mainstay drugs in treating HIV, though lopinavir is now a third-line drug in the US and Europe owing to very real and unpleasant side effects--side effects that could be lethal in a sick person.

Anyway, coronaviruses like COVID have their own proteases, so the basic reasoning was, "well, since both viruses have proteases, maybe it'll work." It wasn't that shot-in-the-dark, though: despite the fact that HIV is a very different virus and is far away from COVID on the evolutionary tree, the reasoning was based in scientific research, as this paper notes that lopinavir appeared promising as an anti-SARS drug as long ago as 2005. Every drug used by the doctors in Wuhan follows a similar rationale. They did their homework, for sure--and that they did so in the midst of being overrun by a plague that felled members of their own ranks, including a number of people who not only braved the virus but also told truth to power, should earn our eternal thanks, regardless of where we find ourselves on the ideological divide with respect to our governments.

Chloroquine is a drug whose formal development goes way back 1945, but its roots date much further back to the early seventeenth century, when European empires began their systematic program for extracting resources from the tropics in earnest. The earliest Western observations came from observing the medicinal properties of preparations from the bark of the Cinchona tree in the Andean region of South America. The Cinchona gave us quinine, the critical ingredient in the original Gin & Tonic, which in addition to being a delight to drink, provided legitimate protection against malaria. From there, the massively oversimplified story of chloroquine requires a fast forward to the early 19th century, when the foundations of modern medicine were being laid by the development, of all things, of the modern dye industry, because they eventually begat German biochemical and pharmaceutical companies like IG Farben. (If you're puzzled by seeing a reference to dye makers, the link is that 19th-century scientists discovered that some dyes like methylene blue had antimalarial properties, which led to further research. In fact, the story of the link between the dye industry and infectious disease is a pretty fascinating one, as the story of the development of Bactrim--still ubiquitous in modern medicine--cannot be told without explaining its origins in dye research and development. But we're getting far afield, and we still haven't gotten to the meat of this post.)

Anyway, chloroquine was the most promising of the antimalarials that came out of the mid-20th century research, and its mass production led to the first reliable industrial treatment of the disease. At the same time, physicians who were trying to understand the biological process of inflammation (which, one hundred years later, we're still trying to understand) noted that part of chloroquine's effectiveness seemed to reside not only in how it killed the malaria parasite, but also that it seemed to tamp down the human (or "host," in sciencespeak) inflammatory response. That is, it appeared that part of malaria's lethality was not only directly from the parasite, but also from the exaggerated host immune/inflammatory response, and chloroquine seemed in part to work by pulling the reins on inflammation. Which made people wonder whether it might be useful in other diseases where the body had an exaggerated immune response, but not in the setting of malaria. (Spoiler alert: it was.)

The upside was that chloroquine could save you from malaria; the downside was that it wasn't an entirely benign drug in its own right. Tinkering with the drug, chemists added a "hydroxyl" group onto chloroquine (which is to say, an oxygen atom attached to a hydrogen atom), and thus was born hydroxychloroquine. It was one of many different variants that was studied at the time and was found to be as effective against malaria as chloroquine, but with a much more favorable safety profile. This is the bread and butter of what drug companies do, and it's worth noting that chemists in these companies create hundreds of compounds, all slightly different, and run preliminary tests to identify the most promising compounds that might make it to a human trial. Hydroxychloroquine was just one of these hundreds of compounds at the start of the process, and many more drugs fail to get to a drug trial than those that don't--and most of those that make it to a drug trial end up failing as well.

Malaria falls out of this drama by the late 20th century owing to the fact that malaria got wise and developed resistance to chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine, such that there are now few malaria-endemic areas on earth where the drugs still work. Thus, by the time we arrive in the pre-COVID world of early December 2019, hydroxychloroquine's use mainly resided in its anti-inflammatory properties. And the principal diseases of inflammation where they have been found to be most effective have been in lupus and (to a more limited extent) in rheumatoid arthritis. Newer agents have begun to replace hydroxychloroquine, but particularly in lupus, hydroxychloroquine is still commonly used. Which means lupus patients need those drugs to be stockpiled for their use.

The use of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine in the treatment of viral infections dates back to at least the early 1980s, again as virologists tinkered around labs seeing what drugs worked and what didn't against some pet virus. And chloroquine/hydroxychloroquine's record against viruses in the laboratory is pretty good. Poke around Pubmed for awhile and you can see promising results against influenza, Hepatitis C, HIV, and, of course, SARS--a virus that can be thought of as the raging beast relative of COVID, the Trump to COVID's George W Bush, as both are deadly, but one significantly more so. Since January, virologists were able to see the same antiviral effect against COVID, as well. But this is all "in vitro" data, which is to say, those experiments just looked at what the drug did with the virus on the battlefield of a few cells in a petri dish.

That was the background behind hydroxychloroquine's star turn on the COVID stage. But did it work? The most intellectually pure scientific answer is "we don't know." The most likely answer, in the opinion of the Billy Rubin Blog Editorial Staff, is "nope."

The original clinical evidence supporting hydroxychloroquine came from a study found here in the International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents. (Note: this study may be amended, or even withdrawn, but the point is where it moved the needle with respect to how it influenced the medical community, and ultimately, Donald Trump, in March 2020. Thus, post-hoc changes to the article matter little.) The study evaluated 42 patients: 26 got hydroxychloroquine, and 16 did not.

Before we get to just how bad a study it is, let's ponder that sample size for a second. And to get context for that, there needs to be a discussion about case fatality rates.

There is now spirited debate about just how lethal COVID is--is it one percent, or four, or zero-point-five? For my part, I'm going with two general numbers: the overall case fatality of everyone who gets infected is about one in two hundred (or 0.66 percent)--but this is only a rough estimate because we don't know how many people there who have very mild symptoms, or no symptoms at all, since they don't get tested. By contrast, the case fatality rate of people who develop obvious symptoms of illness is somewhere around four or maybe five in one hundred. Overall I think this is a sideshow except for the epidemiologists who need to figure out things like herd immunity in their modeling of just how bad this epidemic is going to get.

But from a clinician's standpoint, the latter number (ie CFR of 4-5%) is far more important, because what we really want to know when using a drug is: if I use this on someone, how likely am I to save a life? And to do that you have to know how many people would die from doing nothing at all. Hopefully everyone out there can see that, if you have a disease in which four people out of one hundred die, then recruiting 42 patients is not going to tell you what you need with any confidence, as all 42 could simply survive by chance. So that's strike one against the study--and it's a big strike, so kinda worth strike two as well.

But there can be clever ways to use a small sample size and get surrogate data to tell you whether doing a full, count-em-up clinical trial to look directly at mortality is worth it. In this case, the surrogate marker is the amount of virus people have in their bodies. This was the finding that got everyone's attention, and it was mainly due to this picture:




It purports to show that those who got hydroxychloroquine (the red line) had a much faster decline in their viral loads than those who didn't--and from that, the conclusion was that we should try this out clinically. The problem, or at least one among many, as extensively outlined in this extremely well-written blog by David Gorski, a surgical oncologist with a PhD and who writes often on clinical trials and the statistics that underlie the work, is that even this scant data is cherry-picked, as (for starters) patients who were moved to the Intensive Care Unit--which is to say, the sickest ones--got left out of the hydroxychloroquine group. This borders on scientific malpractice, and is a rookie error of clinical trial design. In fact, we don't even expect rookies to make mistakes like this.

But what happened in the medical world, even before Donald Trump came along and made everything much worse, was that only the punch line got repeated (hydroxychloroquine works!), and nobody took a direct look at the data to see just how shoddy it was. That's understandable in the layperson world, but for doctors who are trying out untested and potentially dangerous medications in critically ill people, it's the worst kind of laziness. Doctors were prescribing this drug (or, appallingly, hoarding it for their own use) because they read somewhere or heard from someone who spoke to someone who read something that "maybe this works." Well, maybe it does work. But maybe ozone therapy works for Ebola, too. (Hint: it doesn't, really.)

Hydroxychloroquine thus became the great hearsay drug in the early hours of the COVID epidemic. It had no proof, a vaguely plausible justification for its use, and ready availability. But by mid-March, there was still very much no there, there.

Then Trump's tweet came on March 21. I won't say much about this chapter of the saga other than to note that it should be self-evident that there is a high inverse correlation between any pronouncement Donald Trump makes and its truth value. Thus, the fact that he touted the drug (along with a second drug we don't have time to go into, azithromycin) could be reasonably regarded a priori as clinically useless, or at least wildly overblown, simply by dint of the fact that Trump endorsed it.

Meanwhile, in Fantasyland, tales from a "simple, country doctor" were filling the airwaves of the magical hydroxychloroquine elixir. The doctor in question is one Vladimir Zelenko, who noted that he was "seeing tremendous results" in patients using hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin, and zinc. How could such a simple country doctor outwit such heavyweights as Anthony Fauci, who seemed to remain stubbornly skeptical of hydroxychloroquine when doctors like Zelenko could see its obvious promise? Was Fauci secretly part of the Deep State trying to take down Trump by making things worse and withholding lifesaving, and readily available, drugs?

The answer to these questions are simple: Zelenko's simple. He is, like his President who took to the Twitterverse in enthusiastic endorsement, a living, breathing, perfect example of the Dunning-Kruger effect. He is so hopelessly in over his head that he has no mental tools to understand just how in over his head he really is. Maybe--maybe--if COVID were as lethal as Ebola, simple country doctors could see for themselves if a drug worked without having to resort to clinical trials, or troublesome issues like placebo controls and informed consent, or confidence intervals and power calculations. But with this virus? Not so much. You need the machinery of modern medicine, and the research tools that took two centuries to develop, to really know whether you're making an impact. But he has no clue that he has no clue. And so can be said for the followers of Donald Trump, who have been remarkably resistant to grasp his obvious buffoonery, despite it being on daily display over the past month. It's quite impressive, really. Denial is a powerful thing.

But let's end not on the cartoonish stupidity of the President and his Republican enablers, let's turn back to what under normal circumstances would a be solid place to find information, for even they can make the occasional slip-up. And this week, a piece in the New York Times described a new trial on hydroxychloroquine in which the results were favorable. It's certainly a better study than the one mentioned above, though that's a pretty low hurdle. But it's not substantially better: it once again enrolled too small a cohort to look directly at mortality, so it relies on surrogate data that make it hard to know whether the benefit is real or an optical illusion; the patient population studied never got very sick, making its relevance in saving lives of unclear significance; and people did suspiciously well in this cohort, potentially suggesting some unseen bias that shaped the numbers. Everyone in my division took a look at the paper: the reaction was swift, and it wasn't anywhere near as favorable as the warm coverage in the article.

The study hasn't been peer reviewed, where these and other troubling issues would be addressed. Perhaps upon peer review, the study might not even be published because it is found to be wanting. The question, then, is why did NYT pick it up? At the Billy Rubin Blog, we're scratching our heads on that one, because the publication of this article just made it harder for every ID doctor everywhere to try to do their jobs, in no small part because we have to continuously explain to stressed and worried families at length why these studies aren't really very good, and that these drugs come with side effects that might actually end their loved ones life, not save it. This blog entry, despite running to thousands of words, hasn't even taken a shot at explaining a heart-stopping effect called the long QT syndrome, which is almost certainly hydroxychloroquine's most deadly acute effect, and is even worse when used in conjunction with azithromycin, and which I've seen once already in a COVID patient.

Ultimately, there's an old saying in medicine that encapsulates the skepticism that we should be applying toward hydroxychloroquine's boosters, whether those boosters are motivated by naked partisan political considerations (which is to say, Trump, who wants this to go away for narrowly selfish reasons), or by a look-we're-trying-to-do-everything-we-can motivation (doctors who feel they just can't stand around and do nothing). The saying is really old, so old that it comes from a different language, and a different epoch, entirely. The language is Latin, and the saying is primum non nocere. It means, "first, do no harm," and is a caution to physicians who panic in the midst of an outbreak by trying to throw everything at the wall and seeing what sticks. With a four percent case fatal virus, you cannot see what sticks unless you do a clinical trial. With a drug like hydroxychloroquine, off-the-shelf use is a recipe for killing not only one patient--the COVID patient receiving the drug--but possibly a second as well. That person is the lupus patient who has been denied their drug. Because soon, stockpiles of hydroxychloroquine, like the ventilators that are crucial to the survival of the sickest COVID patients, will have dried up.

Among the many lessons that the West African Ebola outbreak had to teach was that physicians shouldn't lose their collective clinical head in a disaster. We should take a page from Douglas Adams, and conduct ourselves by the motto don't panic. We should treat patients by what we know works, not what we hope works, because we're probably going to kill somebody if we practice medicine that way, and we're no better than the Quacks of Old London in the 1600s. We do what we can, and in the meantime, we (urgently) do well-designed, adequately-powered clinical trials to learn what works and what doesn't. That includes a trial of hydroxychloroquine! But without doing good science, we're the same as doctors during the bubonic plague, or at least not as good as we could and should be.

There were no good clinical trials that came out of the West African Ebola outbreak. That failure was enough to get a group of experts together to work with US, European, and African countries so that they were more prepared to do quality clinical trials when the next Ebola outbreak came. Thus, it came to pass, that good clinical trials were conducted in a much more challenging Ebola outbreak in the Congo, so that now we have two therapies that dramatically reduce the mortality from Ebola.

There is no reason why we cannot do such research right now, and adjust our practices as fast as humanly possible, in the midst of this outbreak, especially as it may not be over anytime soon.

--Billy

Tuesday, March 31, 2020

COVID: Ninety Five

A thoroughly scary, sobering piece in the Metro Section of the New York Times has the Billy Rubin blog staff wondering what will await us in just about fourteen days. If the article can be condensed into one word, that word would be: apocalyptic. Nurses and (to a more limited extent) doctors are being sent into battle without proper gear, and anyone who reads this piece can only conclude that, as the tide crests, the lack of protection will consign not only some health care workers, but also some patients, to a very unpleasant and undeserved future.

Yet it is the opening picture that's the subject here: a nurse holding a placard saying "Will Work For a New N95!" It's a clever protest--clever enough to earn its spot in the Paper of Record--and one that expresses enormous anxiety among the doctors and nurses who have moved forth to do battle. Without N95 masks, the reasoning goes, health care workers are as lambs to the COVID slaughter.



Except for one thing: that assumption is not, largely speaking, true.

What is an "N95"? The term derives from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health's categorization of face mask protectiveness. The "N" denotes that it isn't resistant to oils, but the 95 is the important bit, as it indicates that it filters out 95 percent of airborne particles. (There are 99 and 100-grade N masks, as well, in addition to "R" and "P" masks based on oil resistance, each with their own 95/99/100 gradations as well, for a total of nine different types of particulate protective masks. But the only one relevant for this discussion is the N95.)

The N95 mask is used in medicine for what is known as airborne precautions: when one is in the presence of a patient who may pass along an infection that can occur simply by breathing in local air. Two of the most well-known airborne pathogens are tuberculosis and measles. That is, someone with measles doesn't have to cough to infect another person, all they have to do is breathe and have someone in their vicinity. Once they breathe, the virus can remain in the air for hours. (Coughing, though, really throws infectious particles into the air.) The same is true for TB, although TB is not anywhere near as efficient at spreading. (Dr. Rubin has worked for years in TB-endemic places, with TB-positive patients, without the benefit of an N95 mask, and has yet to become infected with TB.)

N95s aren't cheap, and are generally only used in narrow circumstances like TB or measles. Most respiratory viruses do not spread by the airborne route, but instead by something infection control people call droplets. Droplet spread means that the virus or bacteria need to hitch a ride to something--usually phlegm, or the aerosols generated in a sneeze. Those loogies are governed by the laws of gravity, however, and so droplet spread means that, as long as you're not directly in the line of those aerosols or droplets (or, alternately, you're not touching the surfaces where such droplets dropped), they will quickly fall to whatever surface is closest, and as long as you're wearing a mask of some kind (like a surgical mask), you stand almost no chance of getting infected--and we'll get to the "almost" in a second.

The question then becomes: is COVID an airborne, or a droplet/contact-spread, virus?

Getting at this answer is less simple than it may seem, because there's different ways of answering the question. One way is to look at actual people who get infected--say, health care workers--and review whether they were wearing N95s or just surgical masks (which protect adequately against droplet-spread viruses and bacteria), and seeing whether there is a difference in workplace-acquired infections. But this isn't a perfect way of measuring the effect, since people can't be controlled the same way mice can be controlled in a careful experiment. Humans have a way of behaving in ways that confound the results. In the first 55,000 cases of COVID in Wuhan, the Chinese CDC in conjunction with the WHO found that many health care workers--some wearing N95s, others wearing surgical masks--became infected, which would suggest that this virus is mightily transmissible even with the most adequate protection. But then the epidemiologists in China looked at what was happening in the homes of the health care workers, and in a substantial number, they found that workers didn't get infected at work where they adhered to proper precautions, but they got the virus at home, when they reverted to less vigilant practices. (See page 11 of the report.) Thus, it wasn't at all clear whether N95 provided adequate protection or not.

Based on previous experience and study with coronaviruses, the World Health Organization felt that airborne precautions (that is, the use of N95 masks) were not necessary in caring for COVID patients unless they were generating aerosols. Thus, unless someone was doing something to a COVID patient that generated these aerosols, like intubating them, doing chest compressions, swabbing their throats, then a surgical mask would suffice. Which would mean that there should in theory be plenty of N95 masks in the world stockpile available for patient care. (Ventilators, unfortunately, are a different story.)

But a brief letter to the New England Journal of Medicine gave everyone pause when it noted that "aerosol transmission of [COVID]...is plausible, since the virus can remain viable and infectious in aerosols for hours and on surfaces up to days." Here's the pic that shows the scary data:



It's the middle, leftmost, red streak that suggests the ghastly conclusion: the decay of the virus when aerosolized--which is to say, the amount of virus in the air that can be picked up--was slow indeed, lasting for hours. You can see that its decline is much slower than seen in the other panels, which indicates the viability of the virus on various surfaces. The study immediately generated headlines suggesting that WHO had gotten it wrong (and, sort of by extension, the CDC, whose guidelines are subtly different but basically concur with WHO on the notion that there's no strong evidence for airborne spread).

But here's the relevant description from the article of how they designed the study. The authors state that "aerosols...were generated with the use of a three-jet Collison nebulizer and fed into a Goldberg drum to create an aerosolized environment" [my emphasis]. Moreover, the study didn't attempt to recover unambiguously intact coronavirus, but instead performed something called "PCR," which looks for the nucleic acid found inside the virus. It's an indirect, and strong, piece of evidence, but it's not, as it were, airtight, as broken up bits of virus can litter surfaces for hours and days long after intact virus can be recovered--thus getting a positive PCR test but being of little biological relevance.

Which is to say, this doesn't look anything like real life. It aerosolizes the virus, sure, but quite possibly in a way that no human larynx ever could, unless it was the Cough Heard Round The World. Thus, it's an interesting and intriguing piece of experimental science, but it's simply one piece of evidence in a quilt of information about how the virus is spread--and each individual piece of information does not have the ability to stand entirely on its own.

The experimental data adds a perspective, but the epidemiology gives real-life evidence of what happened, although that data too needs to be understood for its limitations. Even the lead author cautioned against over-interpretation of her work, noting in her Twitter feed the following: “Important: we experimentally generated [COVID-19] aerosols and kept them afloat in a drum. This is not evidence of aerosol transmission.”

But this nuance--this will come as a shock--has gotten completely ignored in the fevered rush to judgement and general freakout. And it's, you know, a kinda important nuance. Today's news brings another article even more extreme in its assertions--that an "MIT researcher" (they're smart!) is quoted in the New York Post as saying that COVID "can travel 27 feet and linger for hours." The "research" done to prove this? Turns out it's little more than a commentary, and describes no genuine new study designed to truly evaluate what happens when a COVID-infected patient is in a room with someone who is wearing a surgical mask but not an N95. In fact, it doesn't even deign to consider the strong epidemiologic data suggesting that N95s are unnecessary (with exceptions noted above). What it does show is...a video of someone sneezing. And what is its biggest citation? The very NEJM study described above. Which is to say, there's no there, there.

At the Billy Rubin Blog, we don't consider that to be the kind of science to merit headlines. We like articles like this, instead, that provide a whole lotta context about the question of airborne versus droplet spread. Good reading! And a lot less anxiety-provoking than the New York Post story.

Indeed, in this environment, when fingers are being angrily pointed, this seems to just pour kerosene on the flames. There are real outrages that have occurred as part of this epidemic, and for which many people are going to needlessly die. (See, for instance: Trump, Donald.) But based on what is currently known, there is not yet good reason to believe that there's anything shortsighted about public health officials suggesting that a surgical mask is, for the most part, safe for most situations involving COVID patient care.

The outbreak is moving fast, and that could change, but as of yet, the science isn't even close to being definitive that the N95 is required in all COVID situations.

--Billy

Monday, March 30, 2020

COVID: As Advertised

Scattered thoughts:

I. I am not truly in the trenches, but I'm close enough to the trenches, and I do a number of reconnaissance missions to the trenches each day, such that I can get a good enough view of this beast. Everything I have read on the professional discussion boards, from Washington State to Texas to Louisiana, and above all, to New York, all check out. No disease is pleasant to behold, but some are worse than others, and this one, for those who are most affected, is bad. In the words of a colleague, "there's nothing subtle about this virus." Of course, he was referring to those who are in our intensive care units--it is precisely its subtlety among most infected people that makes it so difficult to contain.

But his point with respect to the sickest is spot on. The Cat scans do not require years of radiology training to elicit a gasp; they don't even require attendance at medical school, as this week's New England Journal images so amply demonstrate:


I have now seen three or four such CTs on patients I'm following; I expect to see more in the days to come.

II. The notion that this was some piddling, trivial virus should have all but evaporated once Italy and Iran exploded at the end of February, although even as recently as two weeks ago a majority of Republicans still found it untroubling. Wuhan was a warning, and Italy and Iran should have led any sane individual who was paying attention to realize that Wuhan wasn't a fluke--that the virus was moving fast, and that with a one percent lethal virus, one percent of a lot of people equals a lot of people. The math behind this was evident two months ago. Quibbling over whether the mortality rate was one percent or two percent or even 0.5 percent missed the essential truth, which is that the absolute number is what's staggering in a virus that can infect with such ease.

There is a virus well known to humans that should have taught us this lesson. Its mortality rate is an order of magnitude less than COVID, but its threat can be found in its extremely high transmissibility, for it is probably the most transmissible virus known to humankind. It is measles, and prior to the measles vaccine, it leveled children: only one in a thousand, which seems laughable, except that a child with measles can infect between 12 and 18 unvaccinated people. Millions of kids died every year, and even now, after a massive campaign that has reduced the mortality rate of measles by almost 75 percent, there are still nearly 150,000 children who die from the disease each year.

COVID's not that good at transmission--an infected person probably infects somewhere between two and three people--but it's good enough in an age of transcontinental travel to light up the globe in only two months.

III. There are at present three countries left in the world that do not have documented cases of COVID, and last week I was on one of the last planes out from one of them. Sometimes I do question my own sanity.

IV. I wonder if we had been lulled into a kind of virus stupor with COVID because we had been so acclimated to the fearsome case fatality rate of Ebola. Get Ebola, and until recently, it was basically flip a coin as to whether you lived or died. Actually it was flipping a trick coin, since the mortality rate was a bit more than 50 percent until finally we established that two specific treatments definitively worked. A one percent case fatality sounds so pedestrian compared to Ebola's case fatality that I wonder if it even caught the epidemiologists by surprise. At any rate, some historian in the years to come may want to juxtapose the initial response to COVID in terms of the deadening of a stimulus-response brought on by Ebola preoccupation.

V. Irony: I worked with Ebola patients during the West African Outbreak five years ago. I was millimeters from that virus. I examined patients while they sweat on my PPE, held them while they vomited and while they cried. I gave one of them back rubs regularly. I held their hands and walked them from the suspect ward to the confirmed ward. On occasion I stuck needles into their arms in order to draw blood tests. And during my time working in the unit, I slept like a baby. I was never scared of what I was doing. It wasn't that I thought I was going to be okay--far from it--it's just that I was able to approach my work with a calm that never abandoned me.

This thing? It's not so much that I'm scared, but I am definitely tense, and in a way that I never was in the Ebola Treatment Unit. The whole damn hospital is Hot--indeed, the entire state is Hot. And there is something grim and menacing about that.

VI. More on books to read another day, but if anyone wants to step back from the daily COVID cacophony yet still learn something about this moment in history in which we find ourselves, there may not be a better book than John Barry's The Great Influenza. It is impossible to read this book now without feeling a sense of deja vu. If you really do have the time on your hands, this is a good place to start--but more on some other pandemic/plague books worth reading another time.

More soon.

--Billy

Wednesday, March 4, 2020

A COVID-19 Analogy: Snowstorm

Here at the Billy Rubin blog we're fond of medical analogies to blizzards, and as I see article after article breathlessly talking about coronavirus-this and coronavirus-that, and what still seems to be mass panic across the world, it may be helpful to think about the coming COVID-19 epidemic in terms of how those of us who live in snowy climates think of bad snowstorms. Which is to say, they can be bad and disruptive--and even deadly--but people have learned to cope with them. And with the proper approach, they can be weathered, but that doesn't mean they don't put a lot of strain on the system.

A massive snowstorm makes travel difficult at best; that drains the workforce of workers who make or do things. (Yes, there's telecommuting, but no, that won't work for, say, plumbers and electricians, who are, you know, important to making things run.) Schools shut down so even people who might be able to make it in are otherwise occupied. Overall, the economic impacts are real, but temporary, and mostly remain confined to cold-weather areas and don't ripple all the way through the economy.

People die in snowstorms, generally by power and heat loss, or through heart attacks of people with heart disease who head out to shovel snow (I saw this during my residency more than once). Do a lot of people die? No. But does a bad snowstorm strain the system if a bunch of frostbitten or collapsing snow shovelers require emergency medical care? Yep.

That's this coronavirus in a nutshell, though with some important differences. The first involves economic impact: the epidemic isn't just limited to a small part of one country, but will shut down the workforce everywhere. Supply chains of products are international, so the effects of China's aggressive containment policies will very likely have a negative impact on the global economy for months. And a snowstorm lasts days; this is already two months old, and it's hard to guess when the workforce brownouts will stop--though I don't think six months is an unreasonable estimate.

And people will die, just as they do in bad blizzards. Any given individual who gets infected is unlikely to die, just like your chance of dying in a snowstorm is fairly low. But that doesn't mean you can't attribute a number of deaths directly to the storm. And again, the storm will hit the entire country (indeed, nearly every country). In aggregate, it will add up to a lot of people.

Just as with snowstorms, there are protective measures that reduce risk, and the most important of these is handwashing.as well as "social distancing"--keeping yourself at arm's length (though the CDC says 6 feet) from people, particularly those with symptoms. It won't reduce the risk to zero, just as no intervention can prevent the hazards associated with a blizzard. But it isn't hopeless, and shouldn't cause mass panic.

Analogies are tricky, but hopefully this one helps give a little context to the numbers.

--Billy

Wednesday, February 26, 2020

COVID-19 *Is* Coming: Should You Panic?

In a word: no. Panicking is never good, gets you nowhere, and invariably makes things worse.

But COVID-19 is coming to the United States. And by that, I mean coming everywhere, as common as the cold or flu. Am I certain that it's going to be widespread? No, but I'm confident at this point that this is a virus that might have been contained at the very beginning, perhaps a week or two into infecting humans, but that opportunity was missed (perhaps squandered), and we are now in a place where the reality is that COVID-19 is going to infect a lot of people. Containing its spread is highly, highly unlikely.

One of the central problems of understanding COVID-19 in the early 21st century is the confusion surrounding public understanding. This reflects the confusion that people have in general with respect to news: there are simply too many sites, and not enough of those sites are reliable and provide responsible journalism that is, for lack of a better word, nutritious. It's mostly junk food for the brain. More on that another day.

Let's start with one of the most simple of aspects of the virus: its relationship to other respiratory seasonal virus illnesses, the cold and the flu. COVID is definitely more deadly than a typical influenza virus. Based on a study of the first ~72,000 cases in China, just over 1,000 people died from the infection, and it becomes a simple matter of dividing the fatalities by the total, and you get a case fatality rate of 2.3 percent. The typical influenza case fatality rate is a little less than one per one thousand, somewhere between ten and twenty times less deadly than COVID.

Now, a 2.3 percent lethal disease may seem trivial when placed against Ebola or Marburg, viruses with case fatality rates in excess of 50 percent (though now there is treatment for Ebola that may drop it to a pedestrian 30 percent). But COVID spreads efficiently. Really efficiently. Take a look just at the number of total cases in South Korea: as of today, the number stands at 1261; one week ago, that number was 51. That is breathtakingly fast. By comparison, the total number of Ebola cases in Liberia in late August 2014--when it was the number one story in the world--was about the same as Korea's total is today (1,378 confirmed and suspected cases). How long did it take to go from fifty cases to that number? Give or take, it took six months--a lumbering pace compared to COVID's lightning-fast spread.

So it is deadly but not Ebola-deadly, and it is efficient at spreading. Part of its efficiency is linked to that relatively low mortality rate: while a few suffer terrible consequences, many more have mild symptoms, some to the point where they do not seek medical care at all, such that they don't change their daily routine, continue to work, shop, and all the other activities that can expose other people. Others may be spreading the virus before they have symptoms, which makes procedures that isolate sick people useless at containment. (The CDC page linked is cautious about this information, noting that pre-symptomatic spread isn't the main way transmission occurs.)

Stopping a virus like Ebola turns out to be relatively easy in the sense that you can perform "contact tracing" by connecting the sick to the sick to the sick, and so on back to Patient Zero, the original source of the outbreak. But there have already been cases in the COVID outbreak that have no obvious source--no contact that would clearly link them in a chain going back to Hubei Province over the past two months. Indeed, one estimate is that for every known transmission outside China that could be traced back to a Chinese citizen, there were two transmissions to outsiders that have gone undetected. This is why the virus has popped up in unexpected places, and will continue to do so.

Which includes the United States--and as if to prove the point, just during the time I've been writing this, it appears a new case has arisen in California. This is breaking news as I type this, so it may require revision. But even if it turns out not to be a confirmed case, it highlights how this virus is already spreading in places we cannot yet know, and the US will be no exception.

So if it's coming anyway, and it's only got a measly two percent fatality rate, why be concerned at all? Instead of panicking, maybe we should just shrug it off, like Rush Limbaugh, that purveyor of well-reasoned political analysis, has opined recently, likening COVID to the common cold?

Similarly: no. Two percent of a lot of people dying in a very short span of time is going to tax the healthcare system to its maximum. There are only so many ventilators in a given area, and areas in an outbreak may not have enough ventilators to go around. We have already seen in China that the people on the front lines taking care of patients become infected and sick, taking them away from non-COVID patient care duties. Who will be able to do the emergency appendectomy when the one surgeon in town is down and out themselves? Will women get needed urgent C-sections if anesthetists aren't available for emergency procedures? The list goes on. This happened during the Ebola outbreak, and people died as a result, without ever having contracted the virus.

That's where I'll stop for the moment, other than to note that, if one can't panic, and one still has to take this with the gravity it deserves, then perhaps the proper mentality can be found in our British cousins--that we should steel ourselves for the coming storm, and simultaneously Keep Calm, and Carry On.

--Billy

Saturday, October 27, 2018

"All Jews Must Die"

Six years ago I interviewed for a job at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. The work was to be based out of Mozambique, where I was planning on living and doing research, but the idea was to spend a year or two there, and thereafter return to Pitt.

They flew me out for an initial interview; I gave a talk about my work at the time on dengue. A few weeks later, they invited me to come back to meet some of the people who would need to sign off on the budget lines required to offer me a job. Miriam came along, and we spent a few days driving around the area, taking a careful look at the housing market in the event that we ever did move. I fell in love with the city in short order. We looked at the Jewish stronghold of Mount Lebanon, the inner-city neighborhood of Shadyside, and some new downtown lofts along the river. Driving around the city, which I was seeing with new, adult eyes since I had last visited in high school, I knew that I was more than willing to move there after a stint in Mozambique. And I knew that I wanted to live in Squirrel Hill.

Had I accepted that job, there is a strong likelihood that Tree of Life would have become my synagogue. Here in Boston, I attend a synagogue with what sounds like a similar moral aesthetic. Our synagogue has a social action committee involved with aiding refugees, and sounds nearly identical to HIAS, the Jewish organization whose purpose is to "protect the most vulnerable refugees, helping them build new lives and reuniting them with their families in safety and freedom." HIAS is based in Maryland, but its local Pittsburgh partner is Tree of Life, and this shared sense of mission may have been one of the critical factors spurring on the shooter to act. It's well within the plausible to think that I could have been there today, maybe cradling one of my children as I watched their lives seep out of them, or them doing the same for me.

That, however, is probably not the most important point to be made in this hour as we collectively process yet another mass murder, and one associated with peaceful worship. I could not have been one of the members of the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, though I mourn those lost lives no less and feel the horror of that violation with equal force; I definitely wouldn't have been at the First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs, Texas, but that provides ice cold comfort, and as I scrolled through the Pittsburgh updates at the hospital, my mind turned once again to  Pastor Frank Pomeroy, who was attending a class in Oklahoma the day of the shooting. His daughter was there and she was killed, as was the visiting pastor Bryan Holcombe and seven of his family members, including a pregnant daughter in law. I assume this quirk of fate must weigh heavily on Pastor Pomeroy.

On Facebook, an acquaintance posts a dirge about the Pittsburgh shooting. At the end, he writes, "please, no political comments"--an entirely reasonable request. It was followed by, "This has nothing to do with right or left, red or blue," which is almost certainly the funniest line I've read all day, although I can't quite say that it brought levity.

The past few days I have been listening to The Death of Expertise, a book by Tom Nichols, a professor at the Naval War College. Though I have occasionally serious quibbles with some of his analysis about the loss of deference to experts, it is a compelling read. At one point he bemoans the loss of reasoned exchange, giving a nod to Godwin's law--the adage that "As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1."

Today, as I drove home listening to Nichols's careful reasoning, I wondered what he might think of the discussions today, in which my people are sitting around thinking about how we Jews--and as the African American victims of the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church demonstrate, other minority groups as well--could be the victim of an act of unspeakable violence specifically directed at them. And, moreover, that these acts would be happening just when the President of the United States repeatedly encourages such people with the praise of brutality, the hymns of resentment, and the encomia to aggression.

Just curious, but when Jews and African Americans are being mowed down by people SS-style as they scream "All Jews Must Die," and that should happen when the worst reprobate to hold the highest office in the land spews forth excrement on a daily basis directed at this-or-that minority group, is invoking the name of Hitler and Naziism still worthy of a condescending tut?
--Billy

Saturday, October 28, 2017

Simple Questions--or Not--At Harvard Medical School

The Billy Rubin Blog went mobile this week, as I gave a talk at the Harvard Medical School Academy's annual Medical Education Day. The theme of the day was medical uncertainty, which given my work in Snowball seemed to the organizers to be a perfect fit. Hopefully it was enough of a match that I didn't embarrass myself completely.

The talk is here: https://soundcloud.com/user-713665386/hms-med-ed-day-oct-24-2017. The talk proper starts at 30 seconds. Apologies for the stops and starts; it felt much more fluid in the moment than the slightly herky-jerky quality the address has on playback.

One exchange at the end is worth meditating on--and I include it here as a meditation, a sidenote, for I don't mean for it to indicate that this was anything approaching the most important moment of the hour. But it does allow a second for a departure on the philosophy of medicine.

When I was taking questions at the end, at about the 51:30 mark, a senior clinician wondered about the process of advice from doctors. Here's the exchange (in raw transcript form--the dead-ends make a little more sense as you hear it in the moment):

MD: There's a very specific prime question that I think is legitimate for patients to ask: "Well, what you you do if you were in my shoes?" And this is a very different question from an erudite but simple discussion of a problem, and they are asking for a very specific answer. And I wondered if you give this, believe in it, and if you do, what do you tell your students about answering such questions?

Me: When they [patients] ask, "What would you do if you were me?"

MD: Yes.

Me: So, I know we have one of my former students here who's a psychiatry resident; I would bounce the question right back and say, "Well, I'm not you...so, um, I'm different. I come with certain, you know, fears, hopes...and then you open up a discussion about, really--because when they ask you that question, they're not asking you that question. They're trying to figure out how to prioritize things. That's my sense."

MD: I think they're asking, very specifically, that question. [Audience laughter.]

Me: I don't...I don't agree. I actually think that question is a good deal more complicated than it looks on the surface.

What's fascinating to me about this exchange, in a talk on uncertainty, was the unequivocal confidence this physician had that patients just want to know what their docs would do in the same situation, no further question asked.

My reply in the moment was not perhaps as quick-witted as I would have liked, but I'd add here that medical decisions aren't the same as car repair decisions. I trust what my mechanic tells me, because a car is an expensive but not priceless piece of machinery, important to my life, worth something but something finite. Thus, I can have a straightforward discussion about whether it makes sense to rebuild the engine for $3000 in a twelve-year old Toyota that has 180,000 miles on it and has a reasonable chance of breaking down in other ways, or just trade it in for a new model. Maybe it's more expensive in the short run to get another car, but that comes at the benefit of fewer headaches induced by repeated trips back to the garage.

A good mechanic can lay out the risks versus benefits in a clear way, and based on what they've seen over the years (the number of 12 year-old Toyotas that make it to 15 without constant servicing, for instance), they can say, "it's a good car, I'd hold on to it, but there's a risk," or alternately say, "I'd be rid of the headache." That kind of advice in that kind of situation is genuinely helpful, and more importantly, the terms being discussed are reasonably clear and equivalent to both parties.

But a doctor just casually dropping advice to a patient's family asking a similar question about a loved one struggling for life on the vent in the ICU, and whether the doctor would request to have all lifesaving measures stopped, presupposes any number of areas of understanding that may not be so. What value does the family place upon religion and ethical precepts about the value of life no matter the struggle? Have they had good or bad experiences with the medical system? Are there life events on the horizon that might make a patient or family try to subjugate themselves to the frequently tortuous procedures and treatments medicine can provide, in order to reach such moments? Does the patient or family have regrets about saying goodbye, of having fights years ago in which no reconciliation has ever been broached?

Don't these questions seem rather more important than, "Well, doctor, what would you do?" as if the subject could be so easily compressed to a singularity of physician wisdom?

And if those questions are explored between doctor and patient, or doctor and family, then what need of such an absurd and possibly dangerously oversimplified question?

--Billy

Saturday, April 22, 2017

Why It's Not OK for Docs to Participate in Executions

Sandeep Jauhar's op-ed in the New York Times today poses precisely the opposite formulation, theoretically offering his musing on ethics as the State of Arkansas rushes to execute as many death-row inmates as possible prior to having their stockpiles of lethal injection drugs expire, for which there have been a flurry of legal challenges, although they have succeeded with one thus far. Given the topicality, Jauhar decided to wedge in some thoughts about how this policy interfaces with the practice of medicine, deciding in the end that it's copacetic.

It isn't, and from the moment the article appeared, a whole lotta people--including a whole lotta doctors--pointed this out, noting the intellectual contortions required to suppose that setting up the killing of an otherwise healthy human being doesn't violate the dictum, "do no harm." (Often dressed up in the fancier Latin phrase primum non nocere, the injunction against doing harm is taught to precisely every medical student, everywhere, on day #1 of school.) Jauhar's main argument revolves around the idea that only physicians have the required expertise to mix a batch of lethal drugs correctly, and therefore they are, in fact, relieving the patient's suffering. It is hard to write this with a straight face.

When I woke up at six and happened upon the article, there were perhaps a dozen replies; within an hour, there were two hundred. As of now, there are more than 500 comments. Most aren't impressed: the vast majority were outraged, and those that defended Jauhar often missed the point as they seemed to think the debate was about the death penalty itself, not the medical ethics of doctors participating in the process.

"As a correctional physician, it is chilling to wake to this. From his tone, it is doubtful to me that he has entered a correctional facility," wrote Matt from Boston in a comment. "The Times' decision to publish this comes as a shock. I entreat the author to refrain from more writing on the topic until he spends time in the correctional setting, meets our patients, and educates himself further on the ethical grounding of medical-correctional standards." Boom.

I had once thought myself a fan of Jauhar as I like to root for physicians who write for the public and help unravel medical complexities, but I'm less enthusiastic than I used to be, that's for sure. A few years ago, he had used similarly questionable logic while he advocated for the return of the old model of Doctor Knows Best, which led me to harrumph about it at the time. I haven't read his writing systematically or exhaustively, and now I'm beginning to worry what I might find if I do.

--Billy

Monday, January 30, 2017

Quick Take on Trump Ban, MD Training Edition

I receive daily updates from a discussion board for faculty members involved in residency programs that train internal medicine physicians. Usually it's a sedate series of discussions about how best to achieve throughput from the ER to the floors, or how best to schedule swing shifts in the ICUs, and so on. There's usually two or three such posts each day, and mostly I flick through them just to see the kinds of technical matters that affect residency training.


Today, however, only 48 hours after Donald Trump's travel ban on people from Syria, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran, there is practically an explosion of posts about what this means for programs across the country and their International Medical Graduates (or "IMGs"). And there's a fair amount of hand-wringing about what comes next. "All of our alarm bells should be going off," wrote one physician--and it's worth noting that in physicianspeak this comment is the rhetorical equivalent of going bonkers, for while I may tend toward hyperbole in political analysis, my colleagues on the whole do not. Trump's order, along with a host of other actions he has taken in his first week in office, is changing this to a degree heretofore unprecedented for this generally nonpartisan, apolitical profession.


The cause of the alarm is that a lot of resident trainees are going to be affected by this--see here for what may be the first of many examples of much-beloved doctors in the middle of training being put on a plane and sent packing without any warning whatsoever. This not only affects the residents, but will probably include a fair number of licensed physicians currently in practice, as visa waivers are granted to physicians from abroad who are willing to work in underserved areas--including many areas of the rural Midwest, ie the kinds of places that have embraced Trump and may soon feel the impact of this policy. In my home of internal medicine, there are about 7000 positions filled each year, of which half are filled by visa-holding immigrant physicians. Of course, only a small portion come from these seven nations, although I have known many a Syrian and Iranian physician in my time.


But the ban's impact is going to affect much more than the physicians coming just from these countries for training. Any Muslim physician, particularly those from majority Muslim countries, would be wise to consider whether their country will soon be on this list as well. And this order comes just as residency programs across the United States sit down and decide whom to rank for offers of residency training--not just internal medicine programs, but all of them. There are about 28,000 first-year spots open, of which nearly a quarter are filled by IMGs. Again, the ban won't affect all IMG physicians, but a substantial majority of programs devoted to primary care--internal medicine, pediatrics, family medicine, as well as psychiatry--are going to have to decide whether they want to roll the dice on highly-qualified Muslim applicants they may ultimately never be able to train, or take less promising applicants from elsewhere, or simply not fill the positions--which increases the work burden for trainees and faculty alike.


Since we aren't by any means experts on the subject, physicians shouldn't be in the business of wading into policies about immigration, but the thoughtlessness that has thus far characterized the first eight days of the Trump administration has forced this on the profession. We not only have only the faintest notion of what consequences this single action will bring, and there is no reason to suspect that we aren't in store for more policies with even greater impacts. In one week, Trump has shown himself to be utterly incapable of governing in a way that does nothing but wreak havoc, and one doesn't need to be a policy expert to see this. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Republican politicians and Washington insiders, who are the only people who have any shot at restraining this man, have been feckless enablers even as they must surely know deep down that if he is not stopped, genuine ruin awaits.


--Billy

Saturday, January 21, 2017

Inauguration Special: Flags & Hypocrisy

This weekend in Billy Rubinland we observe the passing of the torch from one president to another with the same level of dread that tens of millions are experiencing, and as such there isn't much to say, for certainly the words of the new President himself could not be a clearer elucidation of a philosophy of mendacity and unscrupulousness that Donald Trump has not in any way concealed since the very first moment he descended the escalator from his office tower to announce his intentions to supersize his medium-level business practice, which has always sordidly combined corruption and legal intimidation, into levels not previously witnessed in the American political landscape. His candidacy was a long shot, one that involved playing to the basest and most disgusting of the American--that is to say, the white American--id as part of a campaign to satiate an ego that can brook no criticism, and whose philosophy was really only that of self-adulation and worship of the little people because, well...him. He didn't adopt the Republican talking points of the past generation so much as exposed them for the galling hypocrisies that they were, channeling the white rage that Nixon kindled with his "Southern strategy" and Lee Atwater torched with Willie Horton and Rupert Murdoch poured gasoline on with Bill O'Reilly and Sean Hannity, dispensing with the code language that allowed so-called "conservative" politicians to maintain with a straight face that their unhinged hatred of a very mild-mannered, compromise-oriented centrist in Barack Obama was really all about ideology and had nothing, nothing whatsoever to do with race. After the 2016 presidential campaign, anyone who voted for such a scalawag was either an unapologetically virulent racist, a totally uninformed voter who did not bother to listen to his message, or was in absolute denial that somehow this man rejected the putative values of what heretofore had been the official ideology of the Republican party. To those who can't see the man for what he really is, there's not much point in having a discussion.

As I said, there isn't much to say. Basically, I would say this, if I could.

Instead, as we prepare for the Trump administration coming to power and the high likelihood that it will deliver justice on the national and international stage in a thoroughly arbitrary matter, I only wish to talk, ever so briefly, about one small piece of the vast edifice of hatred and hypocrisy that defines at least some of his supporters, and has been validated by the results of the election: the subject of free speech, treason, and the meaning of national flags.

Unsurprisingly, the US flag has become an object of scorn not only outside the United States, but from within as well. (Anyone from beyond the borders who didn't have a favorable opinion of the US prior to today's inaugural address just got a fresh & tasty justification that they were right to hold such views based on words issuing directly from the mouth of the new President himself.) Note here, for instance: US protesters engaged in the burning of the American flag in one of many demonstrations across the country. There were tens of thousands of people expressing their opinions in such marches without resorting to burning the flag, but the right-wing organs of media, along with Trump himself in the run up to the inauguration, immediately turned the actions of perhaps twelve justifiably angry people exercising their right to free speech into a matter of grave importance worthy of ignoring the unprecedented ethical conflicts of interest that--far from draining it--are about to make Washington DC a swamp that will be the envy of third-world tinpot dictators. After all, when uninformed billionaires who think poor people got that way because they are stupid and lazy are handed the keys to government power by a political movement that somehow thought it was--one tries in desperation to stifle a laugh--sticking it to elites....then it's of much, much greater importance to decide whether we should incarcerate some pissed-off millennial for years on the charge that he's somehow damaged the integrity of the country by setting flame to one US Flag.

It's one in a series of Three-card Monte games that will continue for the next four years--or, quite possibly as a result of some truly outrageous voter suppression shenanigans to which Jeff Sessions will minister, much longer. Today, marchers are marching as part of what is thus far not fully coordinated resistance to the Trump administration, and I am with them in spirit, but frankly I'm too depressed to head to the streets. If we live in a democracy that chooses a man such as Donald Trump to run our Government, then there's something very wrong with our democracy, and I'm not sure if marches or voting registration drives or legal filings by smart lawyers who actually fight for the small guys against the real elites will make any difference.

I know this is a hopeless and not especially helpful view of the matter. I would have been appalled by the presidency of a Ted Cruz or a Marco Rubio, and I would have at least have grumbled in disgust at the presidency of a Jeb Bush or a John Kasich or a Rick Perry, but I could at least feel like the combination of venality and shortsightedness was what I was used to. Trump, however, is in a class all by himself. He combines the bullying instincts of Chris Christie, the vengefulness of Rudy Giuliani, and the cluelessness of Ben Carson into one perfect package of American ignoramical anger. What makes him so unlike the other sixteen men who vied for the Republican nomination is that he never tried to hide it; even Christie, who at the start of 2016 I considered the most dangerous candidate, mouthed various pieties on the campaign trail about the value of democracy, and tried to distance himself from the most overtly racist rhetoric of the right-wing rallies. Trump by contrast brought the most deplorable elements--yes, Hillary Clinton was one hundred percent correct when she used the term--front and center into his traveling show of hate and resentment, shocking the Republican establishment which thought that you could only win if you used racism via the means of code words.

Now there's no more code words, and a monster sits in the White House, surrounding himself with people who on the whole are to the "establishment" what street thugs are to poor neighborhoods, with what seems to be only one well-informed and intelligent cabinet member not in possession of reams of conflicts of interest, and he happens to go by the nickname of "Mad Dog." Which is to say, not encouraging. If 60 million people can be presented this kind of a man and want to support him, we're no better off than Berlin was in 1933.

So I'm not going to try to engage in some sort of earnest appeal to anyone about which of the dozens of fubar elements of the Donald Trump presidency are worthy of shock and outrage, as there's not much point. The one quality I find so fresh and appealing about him is that one can't hide behind the veil of being uninformed when opting to support him. He doesn't trouble himself with the details of policy, and doesn't think you should bother, either. His brand, which he made exceedingly clear in his inaugural address, is hate, and you don't need a PhD in government studies or be familiar with the company Blackwater or understand the importance of the Iran-Contra affair or remember who Spiro Agnew was to know what Trump is about. Which is precisely why I see no point in any dialogue with any of his supporters.

But I am perfectly fine, on this first day of the new administration, to point out the standard asymmetric commentary--which is to say, frank hypocrisy--that's been part of the right-wing playbook for the last 40 years on one small matter. The flag-burning issue is, on the one hand, tedious: it forces centrists and liberals into legally defending an action that is, at the very least, aesthetically unpleasant, turning the dialogue into how to keep the mob quiet. (Not, of course, that the right-wing mob has a corner on the market: For left-wing hypocrisies, see "defending the good work that most cops do" or "supporting Israel's right to self-determination" during discussions about either systemic police violence against African-Americans or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But the left-wing mob isn't bankrolled by billions of dollars of organized Pravda-like media whipping them up into an ignorant frenzy on a daily basis.)

Anyway, it's a classic dumb issue intended to distract attention from the true outrages, but regardless it's still rank hypocrisy, for the free speech that Trump and his merry band of Republican lawmakers are prepared to punish in the most severe terms possible--treason is a crime that can carry the penalty of death, of course**--they're perfectly happy to endorse in the form of the waving of the Confederate flag. Since we have become so culturally inured to seeing the rebel flag, it's worth noting that this represents a political entity that was a mortal enemy of the United States of America. Our country has gone to war with many nations, demanding surrender of some of them, signing peace treaties with others. But the United States of America dissolved the Confederate States as an enemy nation, and while there has never been a federal law banning its display or use, it's clear that one who finds the burning of the US flag a crime should be moved in equal measure to criminalize the display of an enemy nation as part of political speech.

Personally I don't care about flag burning, but I'd be perfectly happy if we were willing to categorize traitors consistently across the board. Will our prisons be enough to hold so many? Of course, the penalty for treason includes death, so perhaps we can move things along at a quick clip.

--Billy

(**Not long after the election, I had a long and unpleasant exchange with an acquaintance on Facebook, someone with whom I went to high school and an ardent Trump supporter, about the penalty for treason, since she had joined the chorus that Trump started by posting something vapid about punishing flag-burners. It became a painfully drawn-out conversation because I merely wished for her to acknowledge the simple fact that she was stating her belief that one of her fellow Americans should be shot to death because they burned a flag in a protest. Faced with the unassailable conclusion of her belief, she eventually agreed, at which point I was called an asshole.)